The judge, on the judge's own motion or on affidavit of any person having knowledge of the facts, may issue and sign an order directed to the defendant, stating the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and requiring the defendant to appear before the court to show cause why the defendant should not be held in contempt of court.

IN AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT SCENARIO INVOLVING CLEAR LIABILITY, MULTIPLE CLAIMS, AND INADEQUATE POLICY LIMITS, DOES INSURANCE GOOD FAITH LAW REQUIRE THAT AN INSURER REASONABLY INVESTIGATE ALL CLAIMS PRIOR TO PAYMENT OF ANY CLAIM, KEEP THE INSURED INFORMED OF THE CLAIMS RESOLUTION PROCESS, AND ATTEMPT TO MINIMIZE THE MAGNITUDE OF POSSIBLE EXCESS JUDGMENTS AGAINST THE INSURED?

Every law found upon the statute books is presumptively constitutional until declared otherwise by the courts… [As for an act] not having been declared unconstitutional by the courts, ministerial officers must obey it, until in a proper proceeding its constitutionality is judicially passed upon.

* * * The contention that the oath of a public official requiring him to obey the Constitution places upon him the duty or obligation to determine whether an act is constitutional before he will obey it is . . . without merit. The fallacy in it is that every act of the Legislature is presumptively constitutional until judicially declared otherwise, and the oath of office 'to obey the Constitution' means to obey the Constitution, not as the officer decides, but as judicially determined. The doctrine that the oath of office of a public official requires him to decide for himself whether or not an act is constitutional before obeying it will lead to strange results, and set at naught other binding provisions of the Constitution.

It is contended that an individual may refuse to obey a law that he believes to be unconstitutional, and take a chance on its fate in the courts. He does this, however, 'at his peril'; the 'peril' being to suffer the consequences, such as fine or imprisonment, or both, if the courts should hold the act to be constitutional. A ministerial officer refusing to enforce a law because in his opinion it is unconstitutional takes no such risk. He does nothing 'at his peril,' because he subjects himself to no penalty if his opinion as to the unconstitutionality of an act is not sustained by the courts. It is the doctrine of nullification, pure and simple . . . .

The right to declare an act unconstitutional is purely a judicial power, and cannot be exercised by the officers of the executive department under the guise of the observance of their oath of office to support the Constitution.

To the law every man owes homage, 'the very least as needing its care, the greatest as not exempted from its power.' To allow a ministerial officer to decide upon the validity of a law would be subversive of the great objects and purposes of government, for, if one such officer may assume infallibility, all other like officers may do the same, and thus an end be put to civil government, one of whose cardinal principles is subjection to the laws.

The state has cited no authority for the proposition that obscuring the county name in such a fashion violates section 316.605. The state relies only on the language of the statute. We agree that in using the term, "identification mark" as applied to state license plates in section 316.605(1), the legislature did not intend to include the name of the state and county at the top and bottom of the plate that identify the name of the state or county. Although the language of section 316.605 is broad, the overall statutory scheme suggests that the "identification marks" that must be visible and legible are those that "identify" the "registration." See § 320.06(1)(b), (3)(a) (1995).

The use of license plate rims or frames which obscure the county name appearing at the bottom of the plate is a common practice of long-standing among the citizens of our state. They are frequently supplied by car dealers and many otherwise law abiding citizens install them specially to show allegiance to a club, fraternity, college or sports team or, as a means of other self-expression. It is extremely odd that such an obvious and prevalent practice has generated no reported decisions and no enforcement that the state can identify. Absent any more clear prohibition against this activity in Florida statutes, we decline to declare it a traffic infraction.

With complete respect for the supreme court, I should like to suggest the possibility that the court may have erred in adopting abuse of discretion as the primary or only standard of review for evidence decisions. For I have come to believe that the standard of review for rulings on evidence ought to be primarily de novo or, under certain circumstances, a mixture of de novo and abuse of discretion.
* * * Defenders of the system of broad appellate deference to individualized decisions on evidence should confront the question whether this standard of review has a tendency to "thwart the litigants' legitimate appellate rights ." 696 So. 2d at 1104. Many cases turn directly on some specific piece of evidence admitted or excluded. If there are good reasons for admitting or excluding a piece of evidence, the reasons should be equally good in most, even if not all, cases having the same or similar circumstances. This thought undoubtedly lay behind the supreme court's own determination that "[W]here evidence tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, it is error to deny its admission." [e.s.]). Rivera v. State, 561 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1990). I therefore believe that it is time for the supreme court to rethink its formulation of the sole standard of review for the admission or exclusion of evidence.

It is time to retreat from the notion of broad discretion in trial judges and to adopt a standard recognizing that most evidence decisions express a system-wide application as to what is permissible evidence in our courtrooms.

HAS SECTION ONE OF CHAPTER 2001-58, LAWS OF FLORIDA, LEGISLATIVELY OVERRULED DELGADO V. STATE, 776 SO. 2D 233 (FLA. 2000), AS TO CASES NOT FINAL AT THE TIME OF SUCH DECISION IN WHICH THE OFFENSES WERE COMMITTED ON OR AFTER FEBRUARY 1, 2000, THEREBY PERMITTING A TRIAL COURT TO INSTRUCT A JURY THAT IT MAY FIND A DEFENDANT GUILTY OF BURGLARY, DESPITE EVIDENCE SHOWING A LEGAL ENTRY INTO THE PREMISES AND THAT AN OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED THEREIN WHILE THE DEFENDANT REMAINED WITHIN NON-SURREPTITIOUSLY?

In any medical liability claim involving a contingency fee, the claimant is entitled to receive no less than 70% of the first $250,000.00 in all damages received by the claimant, exclusive of reasonable and customary costs, whether received by judgment, settlement, or otherwise, and regardless of the number of defendants. The claimant is entitled to 90% of all damages in excess of $250,000.00, exclusive of reasonable and customary costs and regardless of the number of defendants. This provision is self-executing and does not require implementing legislation.

Judge Pryor’s appointment is inconsistent with any of the assumed purposes of the recess appointments clause. The recess during which Mr. Pryor was appointed is the shortest intrasession recess ever used to attempt to appoint an Article III judge. This appointment, to a court with eleven active judges and six senior judges, made on the afternoon of the last business day before the day the Senate session resumed, and to a vacancy that had been open and the subject of confirmation proceedings long before the recess, cannot be justified as urgently necessary for the conduct of the Court’s business or because the Senate was, due to the brief recess, unavailable to provide advice and consent regarding the nomination.

It should be noted that the practice of intrasession as opposed to intersession recess appointments of any kind is a relatively recent phenomenon, without any roots in history. It appears that intrasession appointments were unknown until 1867, and that there were none between 1867 and 1928. Intrasession Article III appointments have been exceedingly rare, almost all in a cluster from 1947 to 1954. There have been none since 1954, until now.

IS THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF AN AUTOMOBILE AT THE RETAIL LEVEL FOR THE BUYER'S PERSONAL OR HOUSEHOLD USE A "COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION" AS DEFINED BY SECTION 768.73, FLORIDA STATUTES (1995), THEREBY LIMITING PUNITIVE DAMAGES NOT TO EXCEED THREE TIMES THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES?

First, for what we think and hope is the first and last time in legal history, an assistant state attorney was permitted to be called as a witness in the case and to testify, allegedly as "background," to her investigation of the case itself, her opinion concerning the defendant’s guilt, her assessment of the victim’s credibility, and that the defendant had committed many other uncharged crimes against the victim. Even an intimation in argument by the prosecutor of any one of these matters is patent reversible error.

DOES THE RYCE ACT REQUIRE THAT THE CURRENT INCARCERATION BE FOR A SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENSE?

In this case, there will be no question that Jeannie [sic] Bickner died a horrible, horrible death. Surely she did and that will be shown to you. In fact, that horrible tragedy will be proved to your satisfaction beyond any reasonable doubt. In this case, there won't be any question, none whatsoever, that my client, Joe Elton Nixon, caused Jeannie [sic] Bickner's death. Likewise, that fact will be proved to your satisfaction beyond any reasonable doubt. This case is about the death of Joe Elton Nixon and whether it should occur within the next few years by electrocution or maybe its natural expiration after a lifetime of confinement.