WHETHER, UNDER SECTION 120.54(4), FLORIDA STATUTES (2004), THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SET FORTH SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR AN EMERGENCY RULE ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR CONDUCTING MANUAL RECOUNTS OF OVERVOTES AND UNDERVOTES, AS APPLIED TO TOUCHSCREEN VOTING SYSTEMS?

The legislature shall not limit or deny the privacy right guaranteed to a minor under the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Notwithstanding a minor's right of privacy provided in Section 23 of Article I, the Legislature is authorized to require by general law for notification to a parent or guardian of a minor before the termination of the minor's pregnancy. The Legislature shall provide exceptions to such requirements for notification and shall create a process for judicial waiver of the notification.

The action may be brought by the resident or his or her guardian, by a person or organization acting on behalf of a resident with the consent of the resident or his or her guardian, or by the personal representative of the estate of a deceased resident when the cause of death resulted from the deprivation or infringement of the decedent's rights.

MAY A COURT APPLY A CONTINGENCY RISK MULTIPLIER IN AWARDING ATTTORNEYS FEES PURSUANT TO SECTION 44.103, FLORIDA STATUTES (2003)?

[I]t is not the nature of this Court of Appeals to blink because a case is hard or sensitive.

Under the unique and peculiar circumstances in this case, we determine the trial court’s dismissal of this action was too harsh a sanction. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. The trial court can, however, consider other sanctions, such as fees and costs, should it deem them fit and proper.
Reversed and remanded.

(a) Except in cases of treason and in cases where impeachment results in conviction, the governor may, by executive order filed with the secretary of state, suspend collection of fines and forfeitures, grant reprieves not exceeding sixty days and, with the approval of three members of the cabinet, grant full or conditional pardons, restore civil rights, commute punishment, and remit fines and forfeitures for offenses.
(b) In cases of treason the governor may grant reprieves until adjournment of the regular session of the legislature convening next after the conviction, at which session the legislature may grant a pardon or further reprieve; otherwise the sentence shall be executed.

One side says that because Michael brought the petition the Schindlers had to disprove Terri's wishes. It is my understanding from reading several other cases on end of life procedures that the petitioner for removal must provide the 'clear and convincing' evidence that the ward would not want want to be kept alive by extraordinary measures. In other words it's the opposite of criminal trial where the plantiff actually has to defend the statements he's making. Does Florida law work the opposite or am I just misunderstanding what the law says? If you could explain this better I think it would help greatly.

It's somewhat awkward to speak of burdens in this context because it's not as if someone came into court as a plaintiff and had the burden of proving something to obtain relief from a judge or jury. It's difficult to conceptualize any result in this sort of case as "relief."

The trial judge's role was to determine what Terri would want to do in this situation. Under controlling Florida case law, there is a presumption that she would continue to receive life-prolonging measures, and that presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

So, before Judge Greer could decide that Terri would not wish to continue receiving her feeding tube, he had to determine that clear and convincing evidence supported that result.

I think of it as a two-step process. First, decide if, based on all the evidence (and only the evidence) presented in court, would Terri choose to continue receiving the feeding tube or would she choose not to do so. If the answer is that she would not, then decide if the evidence supporting that result meets the standard of "clear and convincing" evidence. If it does, then the ultimate decision is to discontinue life-prolonging measures. If it does not, or if the answer to the first question was that she would continue to receive life-prolonging measures, then life-prolonging measures should be continued.

I find this view more accurate, and certainly less awkward, then talking about whether someone carried a "burden" of proving someone else's wishes.

There must be more than a "preponderance of the evidence," but the proof need not be "beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt." This intermediate level of proof entails both a qualitative and quantitative standard. The evidence must be credible; the memories of the witnesses must be clear and without confusion; and the sum total of the evidence must be of sufficient weight to convince the trier of fact without hesitancy.

Clear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.

The testimony of some witnesses must be considered with more caution than the testimony of other witnesses. For example, a witness who was using addictive drugs during the time he or she testified about may have an impaired memory concerning the events that occurred during that time.... So, while a witness of that kind may be entirely truthful when testifying, you should consider that testimony with more caution than the testimony of other witnesses.