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|Any Remark Found On Abstract Appeal Should Be Attributed Solely To Its Author|
SHOULD THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RECONSIDER THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE ISSUE IN LIGHT OF THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT STANDARD?As these questions show, the Third District has apparently grown weary of reversals based on procedural problems in peremptory strike challenges where the problems have had no discernible impact on the fairness of the proceedings.
IN LIGHT OF THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE OBJECTION TO A CHALLENGE (THAT OPPOSING COUNSEL IS CLAIMING THAT THE PROPONENT OF THE CHALLENGE IS ATTEMPTING TO REMOVE A JUROR BASED UPON THE JUROR'S RACE, ETHINICITY, OR GENDER IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES and FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONS) AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES, SHOULD THE OBJECTING PARTY BE REQUIRED TO AT LEAST ALLEGE THAT THE CHALLENGE WAS RACIALLY (OR OTHERWISE IMPERMISSIBLY MOTIVATED)?
SHOULD FLORIDA FOLLOW FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE STANDARD EMPLOYED IN FEDERAL CASES WHICH REQUIRES THE DEMONSTRATION OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DISCRIMINATION?
SHOULD WE CONTINUE TO REQUIRE REVERSALS DUE TO PROCEDURAL ERRORS REGARDING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES WHEN THE RECORD LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT THE CHALLENGES WERE NOT MOTIVATED BY RACIAL PREJUDICE AND WHERE THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT ANY SUCH PREJUDICE INFECTED THE JURY WHICH TRIED THE DEFENDANT?
¶1 is a simple carryover provision dealing with Supreme Court jurisdiction, which is currently defined under Article V, section 3(b) of the FL Constitution (defining its appellate jurisdiction, discretionary review, and authority over original proceedings).Thanks, David. If you're right, many of the 1885 provisions are still in effect today, including, of course, the provision that gives circuit courts jurisdiction over all cases involving the legality of any tax or toll.
¶2 is a carryover provision for the DCAs (whose jurisdiction is currently defined in Article V, section 4(b) of the FL Constitution) now codified in Chapter 35 of the FL Statutes.
¶3 deals with the jurisdiction of the Circuit courts, now codified at Section 26.012 of the FL Statues. It tracks the language of section 20 almost verbatim.
¶4 deals with the jurisdiction of the County courts, now codified at Section 34.01 and 34.011 (adding jurisdiction over landlord & tenant cases) of the FL Statutes. It tracks the language of section 20 almost verbatim, except it changes the amount at controversy in civil actions from an upward threshold of $2,500 to $15,000.
¶5 deals with the Judicial Nominating Commission (JNC), which is now codified at Section 43.291 of the FL Statutes. The Governor now appoints members, rather than the Board of Governors. The mix of membership qualifications was also changed. He appoints 4 (rather than 3) members who are practicing attorneys in their territorial jurisdiction, and 5 more (rather than 6) of which at least 2 (rather than 3) are practicing attorneys. Previously, 3 members had to be non-lawyers; there is no such requirement today.
¶6 deals with the public role of members on the JNC, which is now codified under §43.291(2). It tracks the language of section 20 almost verbatim.
¶7 deals with the term limits of members on the JNC, which is now codified under §43.291(3). Four years remains the length of time a member will serve.
¶8 deals with the disposition of fines & forfeitures collected in county courts, which is now codified at Section 34.191 of the FL Statutes. With some clarifications & qualifications, it tracks the language of section 20 (specific statutes have since been enacted to account for the allocation of various revenues). The funds are still dispersed monthly. That part of section 20 dealing with court costs has been codified at Section 34.041 and 34.045 of the FL Statutes, but still provides for payment into the General Revenue Fund.
¶9 deals with the location of county courts, which is now codified at Section 34.181 of the FL Statutes. It tracks the language of section 20 verbatim.
¶10 (dealing with the division of courts throughout the state) is tracked verbatim at Section 43.30 of the FL Statutes.
¶11 deals with the qualification of county court judges, which is now codified at Section 34.021 of the FL Statues. One major change is that now judges must be lawyers. The only exception is for those judges who were seated prior to July 1, 1978 in a county with a population at or less than 40,000. They can remain judges if they complete a 3-year law training program approved by the Supreme Court (they’re "grandfathered" in with a qualification).
¶12 deals with the authority of municipal prosecutors, which is now codified at 34.13(5) of the FL Statues. It tracks the language of section 20 verbatim.
¶13 does some general housekeeping & ties up loose ends.
Any party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorneys' fees, or both shall serve a motion within than 30 days after filing of the judgment, including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of voluntary dismissal.Effective January 1, 2006, however, the Florida Supreme Court amended the rule to substitute "no later than" for "within," making the new rule:
Any party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorneys' fees, or both shall serve a motion no later than 30 days after filing of the judgment, including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of voluntary dismissal.The amendment is available here.
[The court may] reexamine the law which may be applicable to a case even to the extent of reconsidering the correctness of the conclusions announced in previous cases. And, if the court is a trial court, pointing out such to appellate courts.What are the odds your decision will be reversed by the district court?
Whether our supreme court will determine in the future that it has jurisdiction to review this en banc decision is clearly beyond my ken. Nevertheless, if there were ever a case in which the supreme court should take upon itself to limit the jurisdictional boundaries of en banc consideration, this is the case. In fact, and perhaps ironically, the only matter of exceptional importance in this entire case is whether en banc jurisdiction exists at all.I suspect they will get the message.
I challenge the implication that the restitution issue had anything to do with the vote of the court to go en banc. I suggest, rather, that it is an attempted after-the-fact justification for a decision which otherwise cannot be justified.(footnotes omitted). Keep in mind, Judge Allen's opinion was joined by six other judges, so Judge Wolf's words have many targets.
I am also concerned with the statement that "involvement of a particular party" might justify exercise of the court's en banc jurisdiction. If this statement implies that the name of a particular person involved in the case affects the quantum of consideration and scrutiny available in a particular case, I strongly disagree. A party is entitled to the same consideration from this court whether his name is Childers or Smith. To do otherwise would place more importance on personalities than equal application of the rule of law.
The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11. However, during the 90-day period, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants. Upon stipulation by the parties, the 90-day period may be extended and the statute of limitations is tolled during any such extension. Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit.In that statute, the legislature seems to accept the extension theory and complements it with a 60-day minimum period once the tolling ceases.
IF A TRIAL JUDGE DOES HAVE THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE ON JUVENILES IN A JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING THE MANDATORY SURCHARGES SET FORTH IN SECTIONS 938.08 AND 930.085, IS THERE A STATUTORY BASIS TO IMPOSE THESE COSTS AS LIENS AGAINST THE CHILD'S PARENTS?The district court affirmed the cost-as-lien order in the case.
Deputy Capitano asked Johns whether he had anything illegal on his person or in the car that the deputy "needed to know about." Johns replied, "No, I do not." Deputy Capitano then asked, "[D]o you mind if I look." Johns replied, "[N]ot at all," and held his hands up, a gesture the deputy interpreted as meaning "go ahead." Deputy Capitano found a cigar wrapper containing two small pieces of rock cocaine in Johns' change pocket and arrested him.Honesty.
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