About Abstract Appeal
Terri Schiavo Info:
Terri Schiavo Infopage
2003 Schiavo Posts
2004 Schiavo Posts
2005 Schiavo Posts
Pop Schiavo Posts
Florida Supreme Court
11th Cir Ct of Appeals
Fla Sup Ct Dockets
Fla DCA Dockets
Fla DCA Map
11th Cir En Banc Issues
Useful Org Sites
Fla Bar App Section
Council of App Lawyers
Useful Law Sites
Fla Admin Code
Fla Att'y Gen Opinions
Fla R Appellate Pro
Fla R Civil Pro
Fla R Criminal Pro
Fla R Jud Admin
Fla Fam Law R Pro
Fla Probate R
Fla Small Claims R
Fla Traffic Ct R
Fla Small Claims R
R Reg Fla Bar
11th Cir LR/FRCP/IOP
ND Fla Local Rules
MD Fla Local Rules
SD Fla Local Rules
Fla Sup Ct Filing Instr.
Fla Sup Ct IOP
First DCA Att'y Notice
Second DCA Att'y Notice
Second DCA IOP
Third DCA Att'y Notice
Fourth DCA Att'y Notice
Fourth DCA IOP
Fifth DCA Att'y Notice
11th Cir LR/FRCP/IOP
11th Cir Filing Instr
11th Cir Civ App Stmt
11th Cir Appearance
11th Cir Civ Jury Instr
11th Cir Crim Jury Instr
|Any Remark Found On Abstract Appeal Should Be Attributed Solely To Its Author|
DOES THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN IN RE ESTATE OF WARTELS V. WARTELS, 357 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1978), HAVE CONTINUING VITALITY IN LIGHT OF THE ADOPTION BY THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE OF THE COOPERATIVE ACT, CHAPTER 76-222, LAWS OF FLORIDA?
IF THE ANSWER IS YES, IS IT LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE TO INTERPRET ARTICLE X, SECTION 4(a)(1) OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION DIFFERENTLY FOR FORCED SALE PURPOSES THAN DEVISE AND DESCENT PURPOSES UNDER ARTICLE X, SECTION 4 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
Waiver for failure to file a privilege log should not apply where assertion of the privilege is not document-specific, but category specific and the category itself is plainly protected.The court determined that the privilege claim in this case was clearly category specific -- the category being all findings and opinions of an expert retained by counsel in anticipation of litigation and who is not going to testify at trial.
Here, there was no need to identify specific documents, because any document or statement within the purview of the request was clearly subsumed within the categorical privilege claimed by Petitioner. . . . Requiring Petitioner to file a perfunctory privilege log in this case would serve no legitimate purpose, and would simply elevate form over function.The decision includes some refreshing language about how important privileges should be waived only through serious missteps in discovery.
DOES THE ENABLING STATUTE FOR CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, § 627.351(6), FLA. STAT. (2004), PRECLUDE AN AWARD OF POLICY LIMITS UNDER THE VALUED POLICY LAW, § 627.702(1), FLA. STAT. (2004), WHEN THE COVERED PERIL OF WINDSTORM AND THE EXCLUDED PERIL OF FLOOD COMBINE TO PRODUCE A TOTAL LOSS TO THE INSURED PROPERTY?For the earlier decision answering the question in the negative, look here.
DOES SECTION 627.702(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2004), REFERRED TO AS THE VALUED POLICY LAW, REQUIRE AN INSURANCE CARRIER TO PAY THE FACE AMOUNT OF THE POLICY TO AN OWNER OF A BUILDING DEEMED A TOTAL LOSS WHEN THE BUILDING IS DAMAGED IN PART BY A COVERED PERIL BUT IS SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGED BY AN EXCLUDED PERIL?The district court previously certified the same question in this case with the certification order found here. Notably, the supreme court accepted jurisdiction in that case and will hear oral arguments on it next week.
WHETHER INFORMATION PROVIDED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT BY AN INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER PURSUANT TO THE PROVIDER'S STATUTORY OBLIGATION UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 13032(b) IS ACCORDED A PRESUMPTION OF RELIABILITY AKIN TO THAT OF A CITIZEN INFORMANT SUCH THAT NO INFORMATION CONCERNING THE RELIABILITY OF THE "TIPSTER" IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT.
DOES AN ATTORNEY GARNISHEE HAVE A DUTY TO ISSUE A STOP PAYMENT ORDER FOR A CHECK DRAWN ON HIS OR HER TRUST ACCOUNT AND DELIVERED TO THE PAYEE PRIOR TO THE RECEIPT OF A WRIT OF GARNISHMENT IF THE SERVICE OF THAT WRIT OCCURS PRIOR TO THE PRESENTMENT OF THAT CHECK FOR PAYMENT TO THE ATTORNEY'S BANK?The district court answered that question in the affirmative.
The horse won the Kentucky Derby. Decisively. Tenth fastest time in Derby history. First jewel in the Crown.The Finish Line contains a legal analysis of the causation issue. It is less poetic than the Backstretch but still uses an uncommon tone and unconventional techniques, with many rhetorical questions calculated to lead the reader toward commonsensical conclusions, much as a skillful trial attorney might do with a jury. Footnotes in the Finish Line inform readers of each horse to win the Double Crown or the Triple Crown, with emphasis on the irony of the last Triple Crown winner's name, Affirmed.
Sure, there was some racket in the press afterwards. The Miami newspaper said it saw something in the jockey’s hand, some illegal electric thing, maybe to spark the horse. Turns out the paper was seeing a fantasy in a shadow and retracted the story. But the noise had already begun. Are we looking at a Triple Crown horse?
Then the horse won the Preakness Stakes. And it's not even close. Wins by nearly ten lengths. The horse is so far out front, looks like he could make it past the wire and into the barn before they can take the photo. Hardly anyone asked if the horse ran out of gas for the Belmont. Are you kidding? Racing was all stirred up about the Crown. The feedbox noise grew hot.
* * *The horse did not win the Belmont Stakes. Yeah, he finished in the money, best he could do was show.
* * *Anyhow the horse sues the paper. Says the false report in the Miami paper damaged him. Paper says name your damages. Allow me to clarify, says he. Belmont purse is $1 million. Collaterals bring another $5 million. So I'm out $6 million.
But the steward in the court saw an illegal substance in the damages and disqualified them. The horse now wants the judges to let him back in.
A plea conference is not a meaningless charade to be manipulated willy-nilly after the fact; it is a formal ceremony, under oath, memorializing a crossroads in the case. What is said and done at a plea conference carries consequences.And in case you're curious, the appellant's name was Larry.
The evidentiary issues giving rise to this appeal are basic ones. The State Attorney might consider relying less on intuition and more on training.Ouch.
Although no mention is made in rule 8.225(c)(5) concerning service by e-mail, there are certainly occasions when this method might well be most likely to accomplish service, and it might well be considered as a supplement to the methods identified by the rule. The appropriate committees of the Florida Bar may wish to visit this issue in the future.Rules committees, those comments were directed at you.
DOES THE VERSION OF SECTION 400.023(1), FLORIDA STATUTES, IN EFFECT PRIOR TO ITS AMENDMENT IN 2001 PROHIBIT A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FROM MAINTAINING A CLAIM WHEN THE ALLEGED VIOLATION DID NOT CAUSE THE RESIDENT'S DEATH AND WHEN THE SUIT WAS ORIGINALLY FILED BY THE RESIDENT PRIOR TO HIS OR HER DEATH?
It is not clear why the jury reached . . . two legally inconsistent conclusions. Perhaps, in part, it was the jury instructions, which in this case, were awful. They are confusing, inconsistent, and incorrect. This was not entirely the fault of the trial judge because these instructions, inexplicably, were the product of a stipulation. The jury's plight was made worse by the design of the verdict form . . . .
Conceding they have just a 15 percent chance of winning, [city name] officials have decided to appeal a court ruling that allows [well, something...].I left out the identifying information, which is probably odd in the sense only several hundred people will read this post, while several hundred thousand people received Saturday's paper.
The fact that the legislature failed to give a special definition of a term hardly means that the Committee should refrain from doing so. It is far preferable to have a standardized instruction on this element of the crime used throughout the state than to have ad hoc and differing formulations in each trial where the issue is presented. It strikes us that justice would be better served by a standardized instruction for section 784.048(4) defining maliciously to mean "wrongfully, intentionally, and without legal justification," for that is surely the sense in which the legislature used the term in this statute.It might be noted that Judge Farmer is a member of the standard jury instructions committee for civil cases.
You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering . . . any of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will [be] appointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.Consider also that the suspect proceeds to answer questions in an apparent waiver of his rights to silence and counsel. The answers amount to a confession, and later his counsel asserts the Miranda warnings were constitutionally deficient because they did not inform the suspect of his right to have a lawyer present during questioning. Will that argument prevail?
DOES THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE EXPRESS ADVICE OF THE RIGHT TO THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL DURING QUESTIONING VITIATE MIRANDA WARNINGS WHICH ADVISE OF BOTH (A) THE RIGHT TO TALK TO A LAWYER "BEFORE QUESTIONING" AND (B) THE "RIGHT TO USE" THE RIGHT TO CONSULT A LAWYER "AT ANY TIME" DURING QUESTIONING?
DOES THE "TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY" RULE SET FORTH IN CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), APPLY IN PROBATION AND COMMUNITY CONTROL REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS?As did the other three districts that certified the same question, the Second District answered this question in the negative.
|Discussions On Abstract Appeal Are (At Best) Academic and Are Not Legal Advice. Consult an Attorney in Your Jurisdiction if You Require Legal Advice.|