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WHETHER A PARENT'S AGREEMENT IN A COMMERCIAL TRAVEL CONTRACT TO BINDING ARBITRATION ON BEHALF OF A MINOR CHILD WITH RESPECT TO PROSPECTIVE TORT CLAIMS ARISING IN THE COURSE OF SUCH TRAVEL IS ENFORCEABLE AS TO THE MINOR.
Officer Carter placed Chanthasouxat in the patrol car and informed him that he would receive a citation for failure to have an inside rear-view mirror. Officer Carter then asked Chanthasouxat if he was carrying drugs and if the police could search the van. The patrol car was equipped with a video recorder, and the tape demonstrates that Officer Carter did not display his weapon or use any force or threats when he asked Chanthasouxat if he could search the van. Chanthasouxat agreed to the search. Officer Carter then asked Xayasane to join Chanthasouxat in the patrol car and called for back-up. After additional officers arrived, the police searched the van and found approximately fifteen kilograms of cocaine. While Chanthasouxat and Xayasane were in the patrol car, the patrol car video camera recorded their discussion of how they would reconcile their stories. Their conversation also demonstrated that they knew they were carrying cocaine.
ARE THE ANDERS PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES TO BE FOLLOWED IN CASES INVOLVING APPEALS FROM JIMMY RYCE ACT COMMITMENT ORDERS?Second, in this case, the Second District certified this question:
DOES THE MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY ACT, CHAPTER 712, FLORIDA STATUTES, OPERATE TO EXTINGUISH AN OTHERWISE VALID CLAIM OF A STATUTORY WAY OF NECESSITY WHEN SUCH CLAIM WAS NOT TIMELY ASSERTED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THAT ACT?The district court's answer to this question was yes, based on what the court understood to be facially controlling but potentially distinguishable case law. Hence, the certification.
Detective Sergeant John Leonard of the Coconut Creek Police Department lawfully arrested defendant, Robert Sills, for certain traffic offenses committed within the municipal limits of Coconut Creek. After being placed under arrest and advised as to his rights, Sills volunteered that although the vehicle contained no narcotics, he had some at his house and would be willing to accompany the officers to his house in the City of Lauderdale Lakes to recover them. Detective Leonard again advised Sills of his constitutional rights. Sills, after responding that he understood his rights and waived them, told Leonard that he had a large number of oxycodone pills at his house, that he intended selling them for a profit and that he had been on the way to retrieve the pills when he was stopped. Sills also indicated he was capable of obtaining large amounts of oxycodone and heroin from Miami and was interested in becoming a police informant.Which begs the question: what were the traffic offenses?
Is an arbitration agreement enforceable when it is included as a requirement of a payment instrument sale executed pursuant to Florida Statute Chapter 560, Part II, and the arbitration is to be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sections 1-16?The district court held the agreement enforceable, agreeing with a decision issued last year by the Fourth District on the same point and which is currently under review by the Supreme Court.
MAY AN INDIVIDUAL BE COMMITTED UNDER THE JIMMY RYCE ACT IN THE ABSENCE OF A JURY INSTRUCTION THAT THE STATE MUST PROVE THAT THE INDIVIDUAL HAS SERIOUS DIFFICULTY IN CONTROLLING HIS OR HER DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR?
I entirely agree with affirmance, notwithstanding that my failure to adhere to the rule that cases should be decided on the basis they were litigated below and argued on appeal led to the vehement expression of views at oral argument which, it was soon revealed, were contrary to the law of Florida. No harm done except to my (heretofore monumental) legal ego.
"This legislation delivers relief to the insurance industry without asking it to make sacrifices such as those being required of patients, attorneys and physicians," said Senate Democratic Leader Ron Klein, D-Boca Raton.Yep. That's sacrifices required of attorneys.
The goal of Congress in enacting the Federal Arbitration Act was to place arbitration agreements " 'upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they] belong[ ].' " Thus, the policy embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act is one favoring enforcement of contracts, not one favoring arbitration over litigation. . . . Because the actual intended federal policy, as expressed by Congress, is enforcement of contracts, not enforcement of arbitration agreements, the cases requiring a finding of prejudice are focused on the wrong goal.Second, observing that the Eleventh Circuit is on the other side of the split and requires a showing of prejudice to find a waiver of the right to arbitrate, the Second District reminded us:
[T]his court is not bound by decisions of the Eleventh Circuit on issues of federal law. Rather, this court is bound only by the United States Supreme Court on issues of the interpretation of a federal statute. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's decisions do not constitute binding precedent on the issue of whether a showing of prejudice is required.(citations in these quotes omitted).
CAN THE ESTOPPEL THEORY APPROVED IN DOE V. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., 653 SO. 2D 371 (FLA. 1995), BE APPLIED TO CONDUCT ARISING OUT OF THE INSURER'S INVESTIGATION OF A CLAIM BEFORE THE CLAIMANT HAS FILED A LAWSUIT?You can read today's decision certifying this question here. You can read the court's original opinion on this subject (holding a negligent pre-litigation investigation can require an insurer to cover a claim not covered under the policy) here.
What makes this otherwise unremarkable case noteworthy are the vitriolic comments about the trial judge contained in the appellate brief . . . . Some of [the] more notable comments were:There is also no question that plaintiffs pursued collection efforts against this defendant on a personal liability basis both before suit and continued to do so in the lawsuit for more than one year, from April 2, 2000 to June, 2001. Was this the pursuit of madness to a friendly court?(emphasis added). These comments, without any record support, appear to make unsubstantiated charges of collusion or impropriety against the trial judge. Such charges, if unsupported, are unprofessional.
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It's true that there was no record made or presented as to the proceedings of the December 14, 2001 court hearing. However, it is submitted that something far off and out of line had to be involved to block what should have been a clear and obvious decision.
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[The appellate attorney] further wrote that the trial judge's ruling was "cockeyed and absurd" and demonstrated a "most startling absence of legal knowledge and irrational decision . . . ." (emphasis added). The Oath of Admission to the Florida Bar requires lawyers to "maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers" and to "abstain from all offensive personality." [These] comments fall far below that standard and are demeaning and patently unprofessional. Such statements, made without any supporting facts, embarrass and denigrate our profession. Therefore, pursuant to the mandate in 5-H Corp. v. Padovano, 708 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1997), we direct that the Clerk of this Court provide a copy of this opinion to the Florida Bar.
